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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the :Jlatter of the Estate of
JA:JlES JOH~ L~~TIS (sometinles kno'''Il as "Latses ")
Deceased.

l

No. 7954

PETITIOX OF RESPONDENT
LATSIS ZAMBUKOS
FOR REHEARING

YIRGI~IA

POINT I
THIS COURT HAS FAILED TO DECIDE THE QUESTION RAISED AS TO PROCEDURE BY PETITION WHEN
A FINAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION AND DISCHARGE
HAS BEEN ENTERED.

POINT II
THIS COURT'S OPINION SANCTIONS A COLLATERAL
ATTACK UPON A FINAL DECREE OF A PROBATE COURT
WITHOUT EVEN ANY ALLEGATION OR ANY PROOF OF
EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

POINT III
THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT WAS UNCONDITIONAL, BUT THIS COURT HAS BEEN MISLED BY
COUNSEL TO READ IT AS CONDITIONAL.

POINT IV
THE RECORD CLEARLY AND AFFIRMATIVELY
SHOWS THAT ALL AND EVERY PROCEDURAL STEP REQUIRED BY STATUTE IN THE PROBATE OF THE ESTATE
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WAS SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED, AND THE COURT'S
OPINION IS INCORRECT AND UNFAIR IN STATING" ...
THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE STATUTORY PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR WERE COMPLIED WITH, NOR
THAT ANY ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DO SO."

POINT I
THIS COURT HAS NOT DECIDED THE ONLY QUESTION PRESENTED ON APPEAL, TO-WIT: CAN APPELLANTS PROPERLY PROCEED BY PETITION IN A CLOSED
PROBATE ACTION WHEREIN THERE HAS BEEN
ENTERED A FINAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION AND
DISCHARGE?

The court's opinion would appear to sanction procedure by petition in such a case as this, but the court
never points out or 'clarifies what then becomes of the
final decree of distribution and discharge. Is it set
aside~ It was not attacked. Is it ignored~ It is not
contended that the court lacked jurisdiction. A petition
is simply a plea or request made to a court to take
some action in a matter pending or being brought before
it. In this case no matter was pending - it had been
terminated and closed for eight years - and no new
action was being brought before the court. There simply
was and is, no legal basis for the procedure which was
attempted by appellants. The lower court decided this
point, but the Supreme Court has never answered yea or
nay. With a final decree standing of record, how can
further proceedings be had until the decree is set asidP
on some legal grounds~ And to set the decree aside,
there must be pleadings and allegations to enable the
adverse party to meet said allegations at a hearing
where evidence is presented and witnesses ean be cross-
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examined, and from which the trial court can find the
facts. This court set forth these principles in the case
of In re Rice's Estate (Utah) 182 P. 2d 111. In that
ra~e the Supre1ne Court sustained a lower Court judgment Yacating a decree of final distribution, although
the proceeding belmY was conunenced by a petition in
probate. This was because (p. 115) all the parties had
been before the Court, and all issues had been pleaded,
including the charge of extrinsic fraud, and all issues
had been fully tried and the extrinsic fraud proved, so
that no prejudice resulted, and no purpose would have
been served by doing it over again.
This Court however affirmed its prior decisions,.
that when issues of fact arise in a probate, the Court
should determine such issues according to the Code of
Civil Procedure. And on the matter of our objection to
the decision here before a hearing, the opinion says, in
italics, for emphasis:
''The statutes in question contemplate that
when an issue of fact arises, as distinguished from
a matter of judicial discretion, such issue of fact
shall be tried in conformity with the requirements
of the Code of Civil Procedure, to allow the
edverse party to challenge the sufficiency of
pleadings by motion or demurrer, to grant parties
a hearing on the issues, including the right to
present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses
produced by the other side.''
Until the decree of final distribution is attacked in
a proper proceeding and set aside, no petition wll lie
in the probate matter.
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POINT II
IN EFFECT THIS COURT SANCTIONS AND UPHOLDS
A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON A FINAL DECREE OF A
PROBATE COURT WITHOUT ANY ALLEGATION OR
PROOF OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

The law is so well and long settled that a final decree
of distribution and discharge can be attacked and set
aside only by direct attack under allegations and proof
of extrinsic fraud that respondents may have neglected
to stress thrs point.
'' ... a court of equity will set aside or annul
a judgment at law on the ground of fraud, only
where the fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the
matter tried in the original action, and not where
the fraud was in the matter on which the judgment was rendered. This rule is based upon the
underlying principles that there must be an end
to litigation, and that an issue which has been
tried and passed on by the first court should not
be retired in an action for relief against the
judgment, since otherwise, litigation would be
interminable; whereas, in the case of extrinsic
fraud, relief is granted on the theory that such
fraud has prevented the unsuccessful party from
fully presenting his case, and hence that there
has never been a real contest before the court
on the subject matter of the suit. 15 RCL Judgments Sec. 215. ''
Comment Note 88 ALR 1201.
This court as late as February, 1953, has held that
where an administrator did not locate absent heirs and
where the court distributed the estate with no provision
for the absent heirs, without proof of extrinsic fraud,

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the decree n1ust ~tand; and the absent heirs were forever
barred and cut oft' frOin their patrimony. Damnum
absque inj1tria applies.
~t'L':

Tiller r. Surton (Utah) 253 P. 2d 618.
''Furthermore, the authorities impose on an
administrator no particular duty of arduousness
in seeking out heirs, but rather require only that
he take possession of the assets, preserve and
account for them, administer them and distribute
them as trustee of the estate under the supervision
or direction of the court to those distributees
whom the court, at some time during the administration, has found from the evidence to be
entitled thereto.

The rule that leads us rather rarely to such
unhappy result and which makes heriship an
entitlement res judicata, once the court has
acquired jurisdiction, followed by distribution
not vulnerable to attack for fraud, mistake or
the like, is based nevertheless on sound principles
which look to the early settlement of litigation,
lest protraction create more frequently for others
the very kind 'Of injustice visited upon the plaintiffs here.''
Tiller v. Norton, supra. (Italics added).
In the case at bar the probate court had jurisdiction.
~ o challenge to this. It made findings and actually
distributed the estate. A final decree was entered. No
allegation of fraud, mistake, or the like has been made
or proved, ~o the decree stands.
In Davis v. Seavey (Wash.) 163 P. 35 the court held
that one claiming under an unprobated codicil more than
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one year after final decree of distribution, had failed to
contest the will within the statutory period of one year
after probate and therefore could attack the decree
of distribution only by alleging and proving fraud in
procuring the decree. The court held against claimant.
''The question is then presented: 'Vhen a
decree of summary distribution has been procured
in good faith and later additional property comes
to attention which brings the estate above $1,500,
should he decree be vacated and the whole estate
subjected to general probate~ "..-e think not. As
hereinabove stated, deorees of the probate court
can be assailed only in equity and upon the same
grounds as other judgments. In re Raleigh's
Estate 48 Utah 128, 158 P 705; In re Brooks'
Estate 83 Utah 506; 30 P. 2d 1065; and 4 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed., Sec. 1011, et
sequi."
In re Linford's Estate (Utah) 239 P. 2d 200.

''We rule that the decree of summary distribution, having been procured in good faith,
and no fraud having been proved, is conclusive
against the petitioners as to the property included
in the original inventory ... ''
In re Lindford's Estate, Supra

If the law now is in Utah that one need not allege
and prove fraud to reopen or set aside a final decree in
a probate proceeding, every real property title in Utah
which has come through probate 18 m jeojardy. .\n
orderly probate proceeding in a court of rompetPnt
jurisdiction is meaningless.
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POINT III
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBATE
COCRT \VAS FINAL AND UNCONDITIONAL AND THEREFORE IS NOT OPEN TO MODIFICATION NOW.

Counsel for appellants have misled the court into
belieYing that smnehow the final decree of distribution
\YH8 conditional. Nothing can be farther from the fact.
A careful reading of that decree discloses :
'"The settleinent, payments, and distribution,
and provision for distribution, made pursuant to
the order herein of February 27, 1945, and as
hereinabove set forth, is approved and allowed.
"It is further ordered that all of the remaining properties of the said estate ... are hereby
distributed to Virginia Latsis, the surviving wife
of the said decedent.''
First the court approved and allowed the "settlement, payments and distribution'' as well as the provision for payment of the amount of the distribution
fixed by the previous order. Then the court unequivocally ''distributed'' the remaining properties to the
wife. There were no conditions recited. The distribution
was final and was followed by the discharge of the
administrators. And this was the act of the court. The
idea seems to have crept in that somehow these administrators decided these things and made distribution.
It was the court which decided and acted. The administrators simply executed the court's order.
As early as 1899 this court enunciated the rule of
law which stands today that where nothing is reserved
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for future determination in a decree or judgment, the
same is final; and the remedy for one adversely affected
is an appeal to the Suprmne Court. State v. Booth
(Utah) 59 P. 553. In the Latsis case everything wa~
finally distributed, and the estate was closed. The
administrators were discharged. No appeal was taken.
And although this Court said that the Probate Judge
approved or adopted provisions of the stipulation
referring to receipts and releases of the estate and said
that this was done ''advisedly and for the purpose of
safeguarding the rights of these foreign heirs,'' yet the
fact is that the Court did not adopt these at all and the
same Judge who signed the order making different
provisions for distribution and payment is the trial
Judge who rejected this contention below and dismissed
appellants petitions; furthermore, the Probate Court
made final distribution and discharge although no
receipts and releases had been obtained from Greece,
therefore, what this Court says was the intent and purpose of the Probate Court is at total variance V~rith the
intent and purpose as shown by the trial Court's own
acts.
On this, and on the point that no issue was raised as
to the final decree being conditional, note that in the
opinion some language was quoted frmn the decree hy
this Court, and after changes and insertions, this
language was construed as an adoption of the prior
stipulation. But, and on the other hand, the appellants
themselves in their brief (p. 15) quote this same identieal
portion of the final decree (without the changes or i11~er-
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tions of course) and there argue, that this language
~imply approved the arrangements n1ade in paragraph
6 of the decree for the payment of appellants ·without
any require1nent of receipts or releases; and then appellants insist that this was an attempt on the part of the
trial Court to change the prior stipulation and order,
instead of adopting it. They simply contended that the
appellants were entitled to a separate notice of this
change in order for the Court to get jurisdiction to make
it.
However, this Court has consistently held that any
lack of notice as to this -would not affect the jurisdiction
to make this decree.
"In other words, from what is there said it
would seem that the notice which is given upon the
filing of the petition for letters of administration
is the jurisdictional notice, the giving of which,
when given as required by the statute, brings not
only the property, but the persons interested
therein, within the jurisdiction of the Court.''
Barrette v. Whitney (Utah) 106 P. 522.
POINT IV
EVERY PROCEDURAL STEP REQUIRED BY STATUTE
WAS SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED.

The court's opinion, without any explanation or substantiation, states that "there is no indication that the
statutory procedures provided for were complied with,
nor that any attempt was made to do so." This is a
most shocking statement and is completely unfounded.
\Vhat statutory procedure was not followed~ The record
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speaks for itself. A minute check will show that every
required procedural step was taken, notices given,
inventory and appraisal, etc., etc. The estate was carefully and fairly administered by an experienced coadministrator with the advice of learned and experienced
counsel. Every step was supervised and ordered by the
District Judge in probate-in part by the Justice who
wrote the Supreme Court's opinion. The probate judge
below found that all statutory procedures provided for
were complied with, he found as to entitlement of distribution, and he distributed the estate in his final decree.
That final and uncondi tonal decree stands unless and
until it is successfully attacked in a proper proceeding
alleging and proving fraud in its procurement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and because of the
manifest unanswered complications, it is respectfully
urged that a rehearing be granted. The impact of this
opinion on Utah probate law and the apparent overruling
of many earlier Utah eases makes it imperative that the
whole matter be carefully represented and reargued to
the Court so that all aspects of the matter may be clarified and correlated with our Uah law as it now stands.
MOSS & HYDE
Attorneys for Respondent
Virginia Latsis Zambukos
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